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Vendor Advisories / US-CERT- AA22-321A: #StopRansomware: Hive Ransomware
« Last post by Netwörkheäd on Yesterday at 06:09:18 AM »
AA22-321A: #StopRansomware: Hive Ransomware

[html]Original release date: November 17, 2022 | Last revised: November 25, 2022

Summary

Actions to Take Today to Mitigate Cyber Threats from Ransomware:



• Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities.

• Enable and enforce multifactor authentication with strong passwords

• Close unused ports and remove any application not deemed necessary for day-to-day operations.



Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.



The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known Hive IOCs and TTPs identified through FBI investigations as recently as November 2022.



FBI, CISA, and HHS encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of ransomware incidents. Victims of ransomware operations should report the incident to their local FBI field office or CISA.



Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 852.9 kb.



For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see AA22-321A.stix (STIX, 43.6 kb).


Technical Details

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 12. See MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced tactics and techniques.



As of November 2022, Hive ransomware actors have victimized over 1,300 companies worldwide, receiving approximately US$100 million in ransom payments, according to FBI information. Hive ransomware follows the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model in which developers create, maintain, and update the malware, and affiliates conduct the ransomware attacks. From June 2021 through at least November 2022, threat actors have used Hive ransomware to target a wide range of businesses and critical infrastructure sectors, including Government Facilities, Communications, Critical Manufacturing, Information Technology, and especially Healthcare and Public Health (HPH).



The method of initial intrusion will depend on which affiliate targets the network. Hive actors have gained initial access to victim networks by using single factor logins via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), virtual private networks (VPNs), and other remote network connection protocols [T1133]. In some cases, Hive actors have bypassed multifactor authentication (MFA) and gained access to FortiOS servers by exploiting Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) CVE-2020-12812. This vulnerability enables a malicious cyber actor to log in without a prompt for the user’s second authentication factor (FortiToken) when the actor changes the case of the username.



Hive actors have also gained initial access to victim networks by distributing phishing emails with malicious attachments [T1566.001] and by exploiting the following vulnerabilities against Microsoft Exchange servers [T1190]:




       
  • CVE-2021-31207 - Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability

  •    
  • CVE-2021-34473 - Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

  •    
  • CVE-2021-34523 - Microsoft Exchange Server Privilege Escalation Vulnerability



After gaining access, Hive ransomware attempts to evade detention by executing processes to:




       
  • Identify processes related to backups, antivirus/anti-spyware, and file copying and then terminating those processes to facilitate file encryption [T1562].

  •    
  • Stop the volume shadow copy services and remove all existing shadow copies via vssadmin on command line or via PowerShell [T1059] [T1490].

  •    
  • Delete Windows event logs, specifically the System, Security and Application logs [T1070].



Prior to encryption, Hive ransomware removes virus definitions and disables all portions of Windows Defender and other common antivirus programs in the system registry [T1112].



Hive actors exfiltrate data likely using a combination of Rclone and the cloud storage service Mega.nz [T1537]. In addition to its capabilities against the Microsoft Windows operating system, Hive ransomware has known variants for Linux, VMware ESXi, and FreeBSD.



During the encryption process, a file named *.key (previously *.key.*) is created in the root directory (C:\ or /root/). Required for decryption, this key file only exists on the machine where it was created and cannot be reproduced. The ransom note, HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt is dropped into each affected directory and states the *.key file cannot be modified, renamed, or deleted, otherwise the encrypted files cannot be recovered [T1486]. The ransom note contains a “sales department” .onion link accessible through a TOR browser, enabling victim organizations to contact the actors through a live chat panel to discuss payment for their files. However, some victims reported receiving phone calls or emails from Hive actors directly to discuss payment.



The ransom note also threatens victims that a public disclosure or leak site accessible on the TOR site, “HiveLeaks”, contains data exfiltrated from victim organizations who do not pay the ransom demand (see figure 1 below). Additionally, Hive actors have used anonymous file sharing sites to disclose exfiltrated data (see table 1 below).



 




   
   
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
   
Table 1: Anonymous File Sharing Sites Used to Disclose Data

         

https://anonfiles[.]com


         

         

https://mega[.]nz


         

         

https://send.exploit[.]in


         

         

https://ufile[.]io


         

         

https://www.sendspace[.]com


         

         

https://privatlab[.]net


         

         

https://privatlab[.]com


         


 



Once the victim organization contacts Hive actors on the live chat panel, Hive actors communicate the ransom amount and the payment deadline. Hive actors negotiate ransom demands in U.S. dollars, with initial amounts ranging from several thousand to millions of dollars. Hive actors demand payment in Bitcoin.



Hive actors have been known to reinfect—with either Hive ransomware or another ransomware variant—the networks of victim organizations who have restored their network without making a ransom payment.



Indicators of Compromise



Threat actors have leveraged the following IOCs during Hive ransomware compromises. Note: Some of these indicators are legitimate applications that Hive threat actors used to aid in further malicious exploitation. FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend removing any application not deemed necessary for day-to-day operations. See tables 2–3 below for IOCs obtained from FBI threat response investigations as recently as November 2022.




   
   
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
      
   
Table 2: Known IOCs as of November 2022

         

Known IOCs - Files


         

         

HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt typically in directories with encrypted files


         

         

*.key typically in the root directory, i.e., C:\ or /root


         

         

hive.bat


         

         

shadow.bat


         

         

asq.r77vh0[.]pw - Server hosted malicious HTA file


         

         

asq.d6shiiwz[.]pw - Server referenced in malicious regsvr32 execution


         

         

asq.swhw71un[.]pw - Server hosted malicious HTA file


         

         

asd.s7610rir[.]pw - Server hosted malicious HTA file


         

         

Windows_x64_encrypt.dll


         

         

Windows_x64_encrypt.exe


         

         

Windows_x32_encrypt.dll


         

         

Windows_x32_encrypt.exe


         

         

Linux_encrypt


         

         

Esxi_encrypt


         

         

Known IOCs – Events


         

         

System, Security and Application Windows event logs wiped


         

         

Microsoft Windows Defender AntiSpyware Protection disabled


         

         

Microsoft Windows Defender AntiVirus Protection disabled


         

         

Volume shadow copies deleted


         

         

Normal boot process prevented


         

         

Known IOCs – Logged Processes


         

         

wevtutil.exe cl system


         

         

wevtutil.exe cl security


         

         

wevtutil.exe cl application


         

         

vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet


         

         

wmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive


         

         

wmic.exe shadowcopy delete


         

         

bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures


         

         

bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled no


         


 




   
   
   
      
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
      
         
         
      
   
Table 3: Potential IOC IP Addresses as of November 2022Note: Some of these observed IP addresses are more than a year old. FBI and CISA recommend vetting or investigating these IP addresses prior to taking forward-looking action like blocking.

         

Potential IOC IP Addresses for Compromise or Exfil:


         

         

84.32.188[.]57


         

         

84.32.188[.]238


         

         

93.115.26[.]251


         

         

185.8.105[.]67


         

         

181.231.81[.]239


         

         

185.8.105[.]112


         

         

186.111.136[.]37


         

         

192.53.123[.]202


         

         

158.69.36[.]149


         

         

46.166.161[.]123


         

         

108.62.118[.]190


         

         

46.166.161[.]93


         

         

185.247.71[.]106


         

         

46.166.162[.]125


         

         

5.61.37[.]207


         

         

46.166.162[.]96


         

         

185.8.105[.]103


         

         

46.166.169[.]34


         

         

5.199.162[.]220


         

         

93.115.25[.]139


         

         

5.199.162[.]229


         

         

93.115.27[.]148


         

         

89.147.109[.]208


         

         

83.97.20[.]81


         

         

5.61.37[.]207


         

         

5.199.162[.]220


         

         

5.199.162[.]229;


         

         

46.166.161[.]93


         

         

46.166.161[.]123;


         

         

46.166.162[.]96


         

         

46.166.162[.]125


         

         

46.166.169[.]34


         

         

83.97.20[.]81


         

         

84.32.188[.]238


         

         

84.32.188[.]57


         

         

89.147.109[.]208


         

         

93.115.25[.]139;


         

         

93.115.26[.]251


         

         

93.115.27[.]148


         

         

108.62.118[.]190


         

         

158.69.36[.]149/span>


         

         

181.231.81[.]239


         

         

185.8.105[.]67


         

         

185.8.105[.]103


         

         

185.8.105[.]112


         

         

185.247.71[.]106


         

         

186.111.136[.]37


         

         

192.53.123[.]202


         


 



MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES



See table 4 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques listed in this advisory.




   
   
      
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
Table 4: Hive Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise

         

Initial Access


         

         

Technique Title


         

         

ID


         

         

Use


         

         

External Remote Services


         

         

T1133


         

         

Hive actors gain access to victim networks by using single factor logins via RDP, VPN, and other remote network connection protocols.


         

         

Exploit Public-Facing Application


         

         

T1190


         

         

Hive actors gain access to victim network by exploiting the following Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities: CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207, CVE-2021-42321.


         

         

Phishing


         

         

T1566.001


         

         

Hive actors gain access to victim networks by distributing phishing emails with malicious attachments.


         

         

Execution


         

         

Technique Title


         

         

ID


         

         

Use


         

         

Command and Scripting Interpreter


         

         

T1059


         

         

Hive actors looks to stop the volume shadow copy services and remove all existing shadow copies via vssadmin on command line or PowerShell.


         

         

Defense Evasion


         

         

Technique Title


         

         

ID


         

         

Use


         

         

Indicator Removal on Host


         

         

T1070


         

         

Hive actors delete Windows event logs, specifically, the System, Security and Application logs.


         

         

Modify Registry


         

         

T1112


         

         

Hive actors set registry values for DisableAntiSpyware and DisableAntiVirus to 1.


         

         

Impair Defenses


         

         

T1562


         

         

Hive actors seek processes related to backups, antivirus/anti-spyware, and file copying and terminates those processes to facilitate file encryption.


         

         

Exfiltration


         

         

Technique Title


         

         

ID


         

         

Use


         

         

Transfer Data to Cloud Account


         

         

T1537


         

         

Hive actors exfiltrate

2
AA22-320A: Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network, Deploy Crypto Miner, Credential Harvester

[html]Original release date: November 16, 2022 | Last revised: November 25, 2022

Summary

From mid-June through mid-July 2022, CISA conducted an incident response engagement at a Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) organization where CISA observed suspected advanced persistent threat (APT) activity. In the course of incident response activities, CISA determined that cyber threat actors exploited the Log4Shell vulnerability in an unpatched VMware Horizon server, installed XMRig crypto mining software, moved laterally to the domain controller (DC), compromised credentials, and then implanted Ngrok reverse proxies on several hosts to maintain persistence. CISA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assess that the FCEB network was compromised by Iranian government-sponsored APT actors.



CISA and FBI are releasing this Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) providing the suspected Iranian government-sponsored actors’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help network defenders detect and protect against related compromises.



CISA and FBI encourage all organizations with affected VMware systems that did not immediately apply available patches or workarounds to assume compromise and initiate threat hunting activities. If suspected initial access or compromise is detected based on IOCs or TTPs described in this CSA, CISA and FBI encourage organizations to assume lateral movement by threat actors, investigate connected systems (including the DC), and audit privileged accounts. All organizations, regardless of identified evidence of compromise, should apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to protect against similar malicious cyber activity.



For more information on Iranian government-sponsored Iranian malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s Iran Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage and FBI’s Iran Threats webpage.



Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 528 kb.



For a downloadable copy of the Malware Analysis Report (MAR) accompanying this report, see: MAR 10387061-1.v1.



For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: AA22-320A.stix, 1.55 mb.


Technical Details

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 11. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques with corresponding mitigation and/or detection recommendations.



Overview



In April 2022, CISA conducted retrospective analysis using EINSTEIN—an FCEB-wide intrusion detection system (IDS) operated and monitored by CISA—and identified suspected APT activity on an FCEB organization’s network. CISA observed bi-directional traffic between the network and a known malicious IP address associated with exploitation of the Log4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) in VMware Horizon servers. In coordination with the FCEB organization, CISA initiated threat hunting incident response activities; however, prior to deploying an incident response team, CISA observed additional suspected APT activity. Specifically, CISA observed HTTPS activity from IP address 51.89.181[.]64 to the organization’s VMware server. Based on trusted third-party reporting, 51.89.181[.]64 is a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server associated with threat actors exploiting Log4Shell. Following HTTPS activity, CISA observed a suspected LDAP callback on port 443 to this IP address. CISA also observed a DNS query for us‐nation‐ny[.]cf that resolved back to 51.89.181[.]64 when the victim server was returning this Log4Shell LDAP callback to the actors’ server.



CISA assessed that this traffic indicated a confirmed compromise based on the successful callback to the indicator and informed the organization of these findings; the organization investigated the activity and found signs of compromise. As trusted-third party reporting associated Log4Shell activity from 51.89.181[.]64 with lateral movement and targeting of DCs, CISA suspected the threat actors had moved laterally and compromised the organization’s DC.



From mid-June through mid-July 2022, CISA conducted an onsite incident response engagement and determined that the organization was compromised as early as February 2022, by likely Iranian government-sponsored APT actors who installed XMRig crypto mining software. The threat actors also moved laterally to the domain controller, compromised credentials, and implanted Ngrok reverse proxies.



Threat Actor Activity



In February 2022, the threat actors exploited Log4Shell [T1190] for initial access [TA0001] to the organization’s unpatched VMware Horizon server. As part of their initial exploitation, CISA observed a connection to known malicious IP address 182.54.217[.]2 lasting 17.6 seconds.



The actors’ exploit payload ran the following PowerShell command [T1059.001] that added an exclusion rule to Windows Defender [T1562.001]:



powershell try{Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\'; Write-Host 'added-exclusion'} catch {Write-Host 'adding-exclusion-failed' }; powershell -enc "$BASE64 encoded payload to download next stage and execute it"



The exclusion rule allowlisted the entire c:\drive, enabling threat actors to download tools to the c:\drive without virus scans. The exploit payload then downloaded mdeploy.text from 182.54.217[.]2/mdepoy.txt to C:\users\public\mde.ps1 [T1105]. When executed, mde.ps1 downloaded file.zip from 182.54.217[.]2 and removed mde.ps1 from the disk [T1070.004].



file.zip contained XMRig cryptocurrency mining software and associated configuration files.




       
  • WinRing0x64.sys – XMRig Miner driver

  •    
  • wuacltservice.exe – XMRig Miner

  •    
  • config.json – XMRig miner configuration

  •    
  • RuntimeBroker.exe – Associated file. This file can create a local user account [T1136.001] and tests for internet connectivity by pinging 8.8.8.8 [T1016.001]. The exploit payload created a Scheduled Task [T1053.005] that executed RuntimeBroker.exe daily as SYSTEM. Note: By exploiting Log4Shell, the actors gained access to a VMware service account with administrator and system level access. The Scheduled Task was named RuntimeBrokerService.exe to masquerade as a legitimate Windows task.



See MAR 10387061-1.v1 for additional information, including IOCs, on these four files.



After obtaining initial access and installing XMRig on the VMWare Horizon server, the actors used RDP [T1021.001] and the built-in Windows user account DefaultAccount [T1078.001] to move laterally [TA0008] to a VMware VDI-KMS host. Once the threat actor established themselves on the VDI-KMS host, CISA observed the actors download around 30 megabytes of files from transfer[.]sh server associated with 144.76.136[.]153. The actors downloaded the following tools:




       
  • PsExec – a Microsoft signed tool for system administrators.

  •    
  • Mimikatz – a credential theft tool.

  •    
  • Ngrok – a reverse proxy tool for proxying an internal service out onto an Ngrok domain, which the user can then access at a randomly generated subdomain at *.ngrok[.]io. CISA has observed this tool in use by some commercial products for benign purposes; however, this process bypasses typical firewall controls and may be a potentially unwanted application in production environments. Ngrok is known to be used for malicious purposes.[1]



The threat actors then executed Mimikatz on VDI-KMS to harvest credentials and created a rogue domain administrator account [T1136.002]. Using the newly created account, the actors leveraged RDP to propagate to several hosts within the network. Upon logging into each host, the actors manually disabled Windows Defender via the Graphical User Interface (GUI) and implanted Ngrok executables and configuration files. The threat actors were able to implant Ngrok on multiple hosts to ensure Ngrok’s persistence should they lose access to a machine during a routine reboot. The actors were able to proxy [T1090] RDP sessions, which were only observable on the local network as outgoing HTTPS port 443 connections to tunnel.us.ngrok[.]com and korgn.su.lennut[.]com (the prior domain in reverse). It is possible, but was not observed, that the threat actors configured a custom domain, or used other Ngrok tunnel domains, wildcarded here as *.ngrok[.]com, *.ngrok[.]io, ngrok.*.tunnel[.]com, or korgn.*.lennut[.]com.



Once the threat actors established a deep foothold in the network and moved laterally to the domain controller, they executed the following PowerShell command on the Active Directory to obtain a list of all machines attached to the domain [T1018]:



Powershell.exe get-adcomputer -filter * -properties * | select name,operatingsystem,ipv4address >



The threat actors also changed the password for the local administrator account [T1098] on several hosts as a backup should the rogue domain administrator account get detected and terminated. Additionally, the threat actor was observed attempting to dump the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process [T1003.001] with task manager but this was stopped by additional anti-virus the FCEB organization had installed.



MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES



See table 1 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory, as well as corresponding detection and/or mitigation recommendations. For additional mitigations, see the Mitigations section.




   
   
      
         
      
      
         
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
         
      
      
         
      
      
         
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
         
Table 1: Cyber Threat Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise

         

Initial Access


         

         

Technique Title


         

         

ID


         

         

Use


         

         

Recommendations


         

         

Exploit Public-Facing Application


         

         

T1190


         

         

The actors exploited Log4Shell for initial access to the organization’s VMware Horizon server.


         

         

Mitigation/Detection: Use a firewall or web-application firewall and enable logging to prevent and detect potential Log4Shell exploitation attempts [M1050].



         

Mitigation: Perform regular vulnerability scanning to detect Log4J vulnerabilities and update Log4J software using vendor provided patches [M1016],[M1051].


         

         

Execution


         

         

Technique Title


         

         

ID


         

         

Use


         

         

Recommendation


         

         

Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell


         

         

T1059.001


         

         

The actors ran PowerShell commands that added an exclusion rule to Windows Defender.



         

The actors executed PowerShell on the AD to obtain a list of machines on the domain.


         

         

Mitigation: Disable or remove PowerShell for non-administrative users [M1042],[M1026] or enable code-signing to execute only signed scripts [M1045].



         

Mitigation: Employ anti-malware to automatically detect and quarantine malicious scripts [M1049].


         

         

Persistence


         

         

Technique Title


         

         

ID


         

         

Use


         

         

Recommendations


         

         

Account Manipulation


         

         

T1098


         

         

The actors changed the password for the local administrator account on several hosts.


         

         

Mitigation: Use multifactor authentication for user and privileged accounts [M1032].



         

Detection: Monitor events for changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728, and 4670. Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity [DS0002].


         

         

Create Account: Local Account


         

         

T1136.001


         

         

The actors’ malware can create local user accounts.


         

         

Mitigation: Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to domain controllers and systems used to create and manage accounts.



         

Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that are associated with local account creation, such as net user /add , useradd, and dscl -create [DS0017].



         

Detection: Enable logging for new user creation [DS0002].


         

         

Create Account: Domain Account


         

         

T1136.002


         

         

The actors used Mimikatz to create a rogue domain administrator account.


         

         

Mitigation: Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to domain controllers and systems used to create and manage accounts.



         

Detection: Enable logging for new user creation, especially domain administrator accounts [DS0002].


         

         

Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task


         

         

T1053.005


         

         

The actors’ exploit payload created Scheduled Task RuntimeBrokerService.exe, which executed RuntimeBroker.exe daily as SYSTEM.


         

         

Mitigation: Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM [M1028].



         

Detection: Monitor for newly constructed processes and/or command-lines that execute from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows [DS0009]



         

Detection: Monitor for newly constructed scheduled jobs by enabling the Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational setting within the event logging service [DS0003].


         

         

Valid Accounts: Default Accounts


         

         

T1078.001


         

         

The actors used built-in Windows user account DefaultAccount.


         

         

Mitigation: Change default usernames and passwords immediately after the installation and before deployment to a production environment [M1027].



         

Detection: Develop rules to monitor logon behavior across default accounts that have been activated or logged into [DS0028].


         

         

Defense Evasion


         

         

Technique Title


         

         

ID


         

         

Use


         

         

Recommendations


         

         

Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools



         

           


         

         

T1562.001


         

         

The actors added an exclusion rule to Windows Defender. The tool allowlisted the entire c:\drive, enabling the actors to bypass virus scans for tools they downloaded to the c:\drive.



         

The actors manually disabled Windows Defender via the GUI.


         

         

Mitigation: Ensure proper user permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services. [M1018].



         

Detection: Monitor for changes made to Windows Registry keys and/or values related to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools such as HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender [DS0024].



         

Detection: Monitor for telemetry that provides context for modification or deletion of information related to security software processes or services such as Windows Defender definition files in Windows and System log files in Linux [DS0013].



         

Detection: Monitor processes for unexpected termination related to security tools/services [DS0009].


         

         

Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion


         

         

T1070.004


         

         

The actors removed malicious file mde.ps1 from the dis.


         

         

Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that could be utilized to unlink, rename, or delete files [DS0017].



         

Detection: Monitor for unexpected deletion of files from the system [DS0022].


         

         

Credential Access


         

         

Technique Title


         

         

ID


         

         

Use


         

         

Recommendations


         

         

OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory


         

         

T1003.001


         

         

The actors were observed trying to dump LSASS process.


         

         

Mitigation: With Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping [M1043]



         

Mitigation: On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to secure LSASS and prevent credential stealing [M1040].



         

Mitigation: Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network [M1027].



         

Detection: Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with LSASS.exe. Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access LSASS.exe by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. [DS0009].



         

Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the LSASS [DS0017].


         

         

Credentials from Password Stores


         

         

T1555


         

         

The actors used Mimikatz to harvest credentials.


         

         

Mitigation: Organizations may consider weighing the risk of storing credentials in password stores and web browsers. If system, software, or web browser credential disclosure is a significant concern, technical controls, policy, and user training may be used to prevent storage of credentials in improper locations [M1027].



         

Detection: Monitor for processes being accessed that may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials [DS0009].



         

Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments that may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials [DS0017].


         

         

Discovery


         

         

Technique Title


         

         

ID


         

         

Use


         

         

Recommendations


         

         

Remote System Discovery


         

         

T1018


         

         

The actors executed a PowerShell command on the AD to obtain a list of all machines attached to the domain.


         

         

3
Forum Lobby / Re: New Member Introductions Thread
« Last post by deanwebb on November 25, 2022, 07:34:31 AM »
Welcome aboard, glad to have you here!
4
Forum Lobby / Re: New Member Introductions Thread
« Last post by netfella on November 24, 2022, 05:08:51 PM »
Hi, I'm from Venezuela, I'm a programmer, learning some basics of networking =]
5
Routing and Switching / Re: Multiple Routers on smart switch
« Last post by deanwebb on November 24, 2022, 01:24:43 PM »
Yes, that would be the right conclusion. It's layer 3 that allows for the interconnection of VLANs.
6
Forum Lobby / Re: Happy Thanksgiving (US)
« Last post by deanwebb on November 24, 2022, 01:14:10 PM »
Happy Thanksgiving to one and to all! And I'm thankful for the good buddies from these forums, going on eight years together!
7
Cisco Identity Services Engine Stored Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability

A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to conduct a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack against a user of the web-based management interface of an affected device.


This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input by the web-based management interface of an affected device. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by injecting malicious code into specific pages of the interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary script code in the context of the affected interface or access sensitive, browser-based information. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker would need valid credentials to access the web-based management interface of an affected device.


Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability.


This advisory is available at the following link:
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ise-stor-xss-kpRBWXY



     
         
Security Impact Rating:  Medium
   
   
       
CVE: CVE-2022-20963
Source: Cisco Identity Services Engine Stored Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability
8
Forum Lobby / Happy Thanksgiving (US)
« Last post by icecream-guy on November 24, 2022, 05:54:17 AM »
To all those that celebrate the holiday.
9
Cisco Identity Services Engine Cross-Site Request Forgery Vulnerability

A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attack and perform arbitrary actions on an affected device.


This vulnerability is due to insufficient CSRF protections for the web-based management interface of an affected device. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by persuading a user of the interface to follow a crafted link. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to perform arbitrary actions on the affected device with the privileges of the target user.


For more information about CSRF attacks and potential mitigations, see Understanding Cross-Site Request Forgery Threat Vectors.


Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability.


This advisory is available at the following link:
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ise-csrf-vgNtTpAs



     
         
Security Impact Rating:  High
   
   
       
CVE: CVE-2022-20961
Source: Cisco Identity Services Engine Cross-Site Request Forgery Vulnerability
10
Cisco Identity Services Engine Path Traversal Vulnerability

A vulnerability in the Localdisk Management feature of Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to make unauthorized changes to the file system of an affected device. 


This vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request with absolute path sequences. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to upload malicious files to arbitrary locations within the file system. Using this method, it is possible to access the underlying operating system and execute commands with system privileges.


Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability.


This advisory is available at the following link:
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ise-path-trav-f6M7cs6r



     
         
Security Impact Rating:  Medium
   
   
       
CVE: CVE-2022-20962
Source: Cisco Identity Services Engine Path Traversal Vulnerability
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